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Abstract 
In this paper we draw on two studies that used face to face, qualitative interviews with 
technology-based small firms (TBSFs) and informal interviews with key informants. The 
interviews took place with two data sets of TBSFs, the first with 20 firms in 2011 and the 
second with 34 agri-business TBSFs in 2013. This allows some temporal comparisons of the 
funding environment for TBSFs in New Zealand, but this was not a longitudinal study as the 
two data sets were composed from the recruitment of different firms. However, all the TBSFs 
were located in New Zealand, a small open economy with a limited domestic market, a 
population of 4.4 million, GDP per capita of US$32,260 (2010) and arguably an immature 
and limited financial infrastructure. This environment is compounded for founding 
technology-based entrepreneurs, since to develop and stay in New Zealand means accepting 
being a long distance from major overseas markets, when in theory at least TBSFs have 
potential to be in global markets. Such TBSFs, therefore, face pressure to move overseas for 
markets and for finance and other resources; if successful they may make attractive takeover 
targets for overseas investors and MNCs.  Despite these challenges, TBSFs have been 
promoted as key contributors to GDP and a way of closing New Zealand’s productivity gap 
(compared with Australia and other developed nations).  Although we find evidence of the 
development of embryonic regional and specialised business angel networks (BANs) on the 
supply-side of finance, there is still a marked reluctance to undertake a search for external 
equity and evidence of discouraged borrowing and discouraged grant-based applications on 
the demand-side. New Zealand is sometimes described as “paradise1” due to its natural and 
outstanding beauty, but in our conclusions we suggest that the comparatively stable economic 
environment has not operated in favour of TBSFs. 
Introduction 
A number of official reports have investigated what appears to be a symptomatic failure 
in New Zealand: to develop, fund and retain the development of R&D intensive, high value, 
technology-based small firms (TBSFs). This under-development has often been seen as one of 
the factors behind New Zealand’s relatively low rate of productivity per capita by 
international comparisons, for example, being some 25% lower than that of Australia (Mai, et 
al. 2010)
2
. A report on high value manufacturing for the former Ministry of Science and 
Innovation (MSI, 2011a, page 19) commented that: 
“The New Zealand high value manufacturing and services sector is under-developed, 
and could contribute substantially more to the economy than it currently does, 
particularly through growth in high productivity advanced technology industries.” 
It could be argued that a small, open economy like New Zealand, remote from major 
world markets, will not have the resources and infrastructure capable of supporting TBSFs 
through to maturity. A population of 4.4 million is coupled with being a long distance from 
                                                          
1
 The use of this term often refers to a fondness for the high quality of life in New Zealand and its economic 
environment, not just the natural beauty of the country. 
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 New Zealand had a GDP per capita of US$32,260 in 2010, compared to a GDP per capita for Australia of 
US$50.746 in 2010 (World Bank, 2012) 
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major overseas markets. New Zealand has proportionately a high business population per 
capita with over 457,000 registered businesses (MED, 2009)
3
.  However, with 98 percent of 
firms employing fewer than 50 employees, 89 percent employing five or fewer and 68 percent 
having no employees, the proportions of small firms in New Zealand are broadly comparable 
internationally.  
In the World Bank’s annual ‘Doing Business’ surveys, New Zealand ranks second 
behind only Singapore as one of the easiest nations in which ‘to do business’, scoring highly 
on the ease of regulations and on business registration (World Bank, 2014)
4
. Frederick and 
Monsen (2010) report GEM data that indicate that New Zealand’s Early Entrepreneurial 
Activity rates as one of the highest in the GEM panel data set. However, the benign regulatory 
environment has created an entrepreneurial paradox. Although New Zealand has a relatively 
high rate of business formation by international comparisons, it has a relatively low 
proportion of high growth firms (MED, 2010). Shangqin, et al (2009, page 3) state that the 
“local ---environment for entrepreneurship--is excellent (yet) innovation remains a problem”. 
The New Zealand Treasury’s 2008 report claims that whilst entrepreneurship start-up rates are 
high, competitive forces are relatively low (partly due to the limited size of the home 
market)
5
. The OECD review on innovation policy in New Zealand commented that a lack of 
investment in business R&D was a weakness of the innovation system in New Zealand 
(OECD, 2007).  
As a result of such low levels of business expenditure on R&D (BERD), 
commercialisation of research has been a specific policy target of the New Zealand 
Government which announced investment of $400 million in the establishment of Callaghan 
Innovation in January 2013. Callaghan Innovation absorbed the former commercialisation 
agency Industrial Research Limited (IRL), and increased incentives for businesses to 
undertake R&D (through technology grants) in its budget for 2013-2014. Although BERD has 
improved in recent years, it still lags behind that of other OECD countries (Statistics New 
Zealand, 2013). 
Agri-business and, more narrowly defined agri-food sectors
6
, are strategically very 
important for the New Zealand economy. However, there is also much latent potential from 
improving the value-added and productive potential of these sectors. For example, the low 
value-added nature of the agri-business industry was highlighted by a report on the sector by 
Coriolis for the former MED in 2012 and pointed in particular to the potential from increased 
exports from the food processing sector (Coriolis, 2012). De Backer and Yamano (2012), in 
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 By comparison, for example, Scotland, with a population of just under 5.2 million, recorded fewer than 
291,838 registered businesses in 2009 (http://www.scotland.gov.uk) (0.11 per head of the population in New 
Zealand compared to 0.06 in Scotland). 
4
 As an economy in which to start a business, New Zealand does even better being ranked as the easiest nation 
in which to start a new business (World Bank, 2013) 
5
 This is supported by the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index (Schwab, 2009) which 
indicates that New Zealand has improved to 20th place overall for 2009, but still performs lower on business 
sophistication and innovation (36th). 
6
 The agri-food sector is defined by the inclusion of all businesses involved in the food supply chain. However, 
for the purposes of this paper, we use agri-business to define the sector more broadly which includes food, 
fibre, forestry and related areas of production.  
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an OECD paper that examined the participation of OECD nations in global value chains 
(GVCs), indicated that economies with high trade/GDP ratios have greater participation in 
GVCs. New Zealand’s ratio at 30% was ranked 29th out of 36 OECD countries. Achieving the 
ambitious targets set out by the New Zealand Government’s Business Growth Agenda 
(MBIE, 2012), will depend on the role of TBSFs in increasing productivity and value-added. 
Theoretically, the role of finance is a crucial factor that can determine whether there is 
successful development for TBSFs and their technology-based entrepreneurs. TBSFs, by their 
nature, are perceived as more risky than other small firms by potential funders and may not 
have the collateral required by banks to fund long term projects (Bank of England, 2001). The 
technology-based entrepreneur is likely to exhaust personal financial resources during R&D 
and early stage development and will need to rely upon staged external investor funding 
(Oakey, 2003). Access to such sources of external and patient capital are often problematic 
and difficult to source, even assuming that a match can be made between the aspirations of 
the technology-based entrepreneur and those of the individual or corporate investor (Mason 
and Harrison, 2004). Classic venture capital is provided in a number of staged deals with 
planned exits through an IPO or trade sale (Mason and Harrison, 2004). Such funding 
‘escalators’ may only exist where there are sufficient networks of individual and corporate 
investors. Well known examples include Silicon Valley, Massachusetts (USA) and 
Cambridge (UK). With such examples relatively rare, the lack of adequate funding sources for 
TBSFs can be viewed as market failure leading to state intervention either through direct 
grant schemes or through attempts to stimulate the market through co-investment schemes.  
The environment for entrepreneurial finance in New Zealand 
The importance of context for understanding entrepreneurial behaviour has been 
identified by a number of researchers who point to the importance of embeddedness, networks 
and contacts for entrepreneurship behaviour and consequential economic development (Zahra, 
2007; McKeever, et al 2014). Likewise the environmental context is important for 
understanding entrepreneurial finance, both the demand side behaviour of entrepreneurs 
seeking external finance and the supply side behaviour of individual investors and other 
actors such as financial institutions. Hence, to place our discussion in context, it is necessary 
to comment on New Zealand’s financial environment.  
For debt capital, New Zealand’s environment has been remarkably stable throughout the 
post Global Financial Crisis (GFC) period. New Zealand’s main commercial banks are owned 
by Australian financial institutions
7
 which did not have any of the spectacular financial 
collapses that characterised the financial institutions in the UK, Europe and North America 
during 2008-2009. Consequently, neither state intervention nor bail-out schemes have been 
needed. Unlike their North American and European counterparts, they are very profitable and 
secure since they did not engage in some of the sub-prime activity that contributed to the post 
GFC bail outs in North America and Europe. For example, a recent PwC report commented 
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 Like Western economies a small number of commercial banks dominate the financial credit markets, the ‘big 
four’ being ANZ, ASB, BNZ, and Westpac, (in 2013 the National bank was taken over by ANZ, further increasing 
the degree of concentration). 
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that the main five commercial banks in New Zealand are all listed in the World’s 50 safest 
banks in the Global Finance Magazine’s list for 2012 (PwC, 2013). 
In theory this should mean that New Zealand’s TBSFs have been faced with secure 
commercial banking institutions which should provide some confidence in their stability. 
Some conclusions are drawn at the end of the paper in the light of this stable and secure 
banking system. It is worth noting as well that New Zealand does not have a state guarantee 
loan scheme which in theory means that the commercial banks can require 100% security for 
any loans to TBSFs. 
For sources of external equity, as might be expected for a small economy, New Zealand 
has historically had limited sources of both venture capital (VC) and business angel 
investment, although there are signs of improvement.  The start-up venture capital market was 
stated as being in a fledging state in 2011 by a New Zealand Venture Investment Fund report 
(NVIF, 2011, page 4):  “The early stage company investment market in New Zealand is still 
in a fledgling state but has made significant progress in the last 10 years”. New Zealand does 
not have a tradition of equity investments by high net worth individuals (HNWIs) and 
according to a previous Governor of the Reserve Bank, New Zealanders have preferred 
historically to invest in property (Bollard, 2006). This has meant that the size of the informal 
angel investment market has been relatively small. A report for the former Ministry of 
Economic Development in 2004 attempted to measure the size of the HNWI market in New 
Zealand. The report estimated that the market at the time was around $500m NZD and that 
the number of individual investors was between 1,000 and 20,000, but only a small 
proportion, less than 100, could be described as active angels (Infometrics, 2004). 
During the post GFC period, private equity markets have seen some developments. For 
example, a growing interest in business angel activity has led to the creation of the Angel 
Association for New Zealand that aims to: “increase the quantity, quality and success of angel 
investments in New Zealand and in doing so create a greater pool of capital for innovative 
start-up companies” (Angel Association, 2014: http://www.angelassociation.co.nz/). Sources 
of VC funds are represented through the New Zealand Venture Capital Association (NZVCA) 
which has been longer established, but has also raised its profile and seeks to provide: “a 
world-best private equity and venture capital environment for the benefit of investors and 
entrepreneurs in New Zealand” (NZVCA, 2014: http://www.nzvca.co.nz) 
Despite these recent developments, sources of external equity for TBSFs are 
acknowledged to be limited and immature, hence the New Zealand Government has 
intervened directly through the provision of technology funding grants that have gradually 
been enhanced and extended. For example, the current New Zealand Government has 
introduced a range of measures, including R&D grants, technology vouchers and tax cuts, 
targeted at raising business levels of BERD (Key, 2010). At the centre of these recent 
measures, the technology transfer vouchers have been targeted at technology transfer 
particularly aimed at trying to improve spin-out commercialisation from New Zealand’s 
Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) and Crown Research Institutes (CRIs). During 2011 and 
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2012, the threshold levels were reduced making vouchers and grants available for smaller 
TBSFs, this being coupled with the announcement of the funding, mentioned earlier, for the 
new Callaghan Innovation. The New Zealand Government has also established additional 
sources of equity through the New Zealand Venture Investment Fund (NZVIF). NZVIF was 
established in 2002, with the aim to “help build a vibrant venture capital market in New 
Zealand” (NZVIF, 2014: (http://www.nzvif.com). NZVIF currently has $200 million of funds 
under management, comprising $160 million in its venture capital fund of funds and $40 
million in a Seed Co-investment Fund (NZVIF, 2014, see later reference and footnote). 
Given this background, this paper examines the finance of TBSFs in New Zealand in 
the post GFC challenging financial environment. In particular, it is concerned with the 
following two broad research questions: 
RQ1: What are the characteristics of the finance of TBSFs in New Zealand? 
RQ2: Has the finance of TBSFs in New Zealand changed over recent years? 
The remaining sections of this paper cover a review of literature and theory relevant to 
the role of finance in TBSFs; research methods and data sources; results and analysis from the 
qualitative interviews, a discussion and implications section before drawing conclusions. 
Review of Literature and Relevant Theoretical Background 
Relevant literature on the finance of TBSFs can be divided into theoretical concepts and 
previous research evidence. The classic theory on the finance of TBSFs stems from the 
economics of information. Applied to SMEs generally, this holds that the existence of 
asymmetric information between potential funders and SME owners produces credit rationing 
because information held by SMEs is opaque, for example, held through knowledge of the 
entrepreneur and not readily available or disclosed. The relationship between SME owners 
and potential funders is seen as a transactional one (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). It is assumed 
that credit rationing will result, although de Meza (2002) argues that credit is over supplied 
because over optimistic entrepreneurs exaggerate returns. 
For TBSFs at an early stage, like all small firms, information is limited and not always 
transparent (Schmid, 2001) and assets are often knowledge-based and intangible, being 
exclusively associated with the founding entrepreneur (Hsu, 2004). In such circumstances, 
entrepreneurs may be reluctant to provide full information about the opportunity because of 
concerns that disclosure may make it easier for others to exploit (Shane and Cable, 2002). A 
more modern development of this theory has moved away from a transaction cost-based to a 
relationship-based approach (Berger and Udell, 2004) Relationships have, of course, always 
been more important for venture capitalists and business angels who will make their 
investment decisions at least as much on management and entrepreneurial abilities as on 
financial projections and business plans (Feeney, et al. 1999; Mason and Stark, 2004). 
When considering TBSFs, a special set of circumstances can be applied: 
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- Extensive R&D periods for product development. This necessitates raising 
finance for R&D and the development of prototypes, that is, distinctive 
requirements for seed capital due to large sunk costs (Geroski, 1995). 
- TSBFs will face a period of negative cash flow and losses during the R&D 
period, this can vary from a few months (say with software providers) to ten 
years or more (say with bio-technology applications). Entrepreneurs will exhaust 
private savings/internal sources and need to rely on raising external capital. 
- Although patents can be used to protect new products/processes, they are 
intangible assets and banks may be unwilling to accept them as security. 
- Developing cash-flow forecasts for the business plan can be problematic since, 
with new technology products, markets may not yet exist. Consequently banks 
are unwilling to lend against forecasts. 
Despite the importance of TBSFs for economic development in advanced industrial 
economies, there has been remarkably little systematic research into the nature of their 
development. One of the reasons for this is that TBSFs are subject to definitional 
discrepancies (no standard definition is applied) and, therefore, panel data sets are 
problematic and expensive to compile. Where studies do exist, they can be difficult to 
compare because of the difference in sampling techniques which are used. Revest and Sapio 
(2010) in a review of evidence on financing TBSFs in Europe mention limited studies in the 
UK, Italy and France. Work has been conducted in the US (Carpenter and Peterson, 2002), 
but Revest and Sapio (page 7) claim that “the robustness of the results, however, is under 
question due to a number of methodological limitations”. Revest and Sapio give four main 
findings: that European TBSFs finance new investments by relying primarily on internal 
funds, due to asymmetric information; that the European venture capital industry is caught up 
with that of US and amounts are too large to be viable for TBSFs; that alternative stock 
markets, such as EASDAQ, have proved unviable and, as a consequence, European 
governments are actively involved in supporting TBSFs’ needs for finance. 
Post GFC it is arguable that TBSFs will be even more financially constrained. One 
study has been undertaken in the UK post GFC (North, et al. 2013). This study conducted a 
telephone-based survey with a sample of 100 TBSFs to examine the extent to which their 
external finance requirements had been met from various sources, since the onset of the 
financial crash. North, et al. (page 256) concluded that accessing formal external finance had 
become more difficult, with more than a third of TBSFs reporting that “financial constraints 
had held back their growth, noticeably the case with spin outs and bio/life science firms which 
tend to be the most R&D intensive and innovative businesses”.  
Mason and Brown’s study with Scottish high growth companies, although not restricted 
to TBSFs, pointed to the importance of serial entrepreneurship and the prior business 
experience of technology-based entrepreneurs for successful high growth companies (Mason 
and Brown, 2013). A similar finding on the importance of prior business experience has been 
reported by Colombo, et al. with their study of science-based entrepreneurship (Colombo, et 
al. 2013). Prior business experience brings additional resources through social capital and 
access to knowledge through networks. Support for the importance of networks is provided by 
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a Dutch study of innovative SMEs by Keizer, et al. (2002), among their findings were that the 
more innovative SMEs utilised networks with knowledge centres (to acquire resources). 
Hopkins, et al. (2013) examined the evolution of biotechnology firms in the UK and US, 
finding that small biotechnology firms have benefited from deals with large pharmaceutical 
firms so that the latter get access to (resources) and capabilities. The emergence of an early 
stage pharmaceutical investment asset class was also found in Cave’s (2009) study of patterns 
of equity investment in UK high tech companies.     
Other studies with TBSFs have tended to be very selective and targeted at particular 
sub-groups such as samples from technology incubators and science parks, partly because of 
the convenience afforded by such samples. These studies confirm the importance of TBSFs 
for local economic development (Jones and Parry, 2011) and have rather mixed results for the 
role of technology incubators (Alsos, et al. 2011). Even selected and specialised studies 
demonstrate the heterogeneity of TBSFs. For example, Cunha, et al.’s study of academic spin-
offs found that even in such closely defined samples a high degree of heterogeneity exists, for 
example between new companies and other TBSFs (Cunha, et al. 2013). 
New Zealand is no exception to the rarity of academic studies on the development of 
TBSFs. Case study investigations with bio-technology firms have pointed to the increased 
need for strategic alliances for small biotechnology firms (Ahn, et al. 2011; Davenport, 2005). 
The increased trend towards agglomeration might suggest that the New Zealand economy is 
too small and the infrastructure insufficiently developed to support strategic alliances. 
Davenport (2005), in a study of innovative SMEs in NZ, pointed to the importance of global, 
rather than local, sources and networks for knowledge acquisition, implying the need for 
policy recognition of the diversity of knowledge acquisition sources and strategic alliances for 
TBSFs. 
Research Method and Data Sources 
For this paper, we combine the data from two qualitative studies with TBSFs.  The 
fieldwork for the first exploratory study was carried out in New Zealand with TBSFs recruited 
from the nation’s two main urban centres: Auckland and Wellington together with a third 
location at Palmerston North. At the time of this study, in 2011, it was felt that TBSFs located 
in New Zealand’s only other large urban area, Christchurch, will have been affected by the 
earthquakes of February and June that year which caused widespread disruption to local 
businesses. The study involved a programme of 20 in-depth, face-to-face qualitative 
interviews with the founders and chief executives of TBSFs drawn from different technology-
based sectors (table 1), although the majority were concerned with IT or digital technology. A 
further seven interviews were conducted with key informants (including investors, incubator 
managers, and economic development agency managers) drawn from the three locations.  
The second data set is drawn from a more narrowly-defined study which focused on 
TBSFs in the agri-business sector. This second study was designed by the authors to build on 
the first study, but to focus on an identified and strategic sub-sector for the New Zealand 
economy, although unlike the first study, access to finance was only part of the focus of the 
interviews which more broadly investigated the role of innovation (Deakins and Bensemann, 
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2013). The narrowness of our sector focus meant that companies could not easily be recruited 
or identified. For recruitment of participating companies we relied on existing contacts at the 
New Zealand Centre for SME Research and expanding the search for suitable respondent 
companies with assistance and recommendations from key informants with economic 
development agencies and their equivalent bodies such as local authorities. This study 
included TBSFs located in Christchurch and the Canterbury region, along with other regions, 
and was undertaken in 2013. A programme of 34 in-depth, face to face interviews was 
undertaken (table 2) and a further nine key informants were consulted. 
The interviews with respondents were conducted using an open-ended interview guide 
which was used to investigate the role of finance in the context of issues and challenges faced 
by the respondents. Interviews were coded against themes drawn from the literature. 
However, it was important for the interviews to be sufficiently open-ended to allow for the 
exploration of additional themes from the data. The research approach allowed for significant 
patterns to emerge as they cut across heterogeneous cases (Patton 2002). Analysis was 
undertaken with QSR Nvivo qualitative data analysis software. Themes from the literature 
were used to identify major ‘nodes’ in the software, but the analysis was undertaken carefully 
to allow the data to generate additional ‘nodes’. This allowed for specific cases and for the 
data to be used inductively, not merely deductively and allowed themes to emerge such as the 
importance of bootstrapping. 
Low risk ethical approval was obtained from Massey University’s Research Ethics 
Committee for both studies and respondents were offered the opportunity to review the 
transcripts and make subsequent changes before analysis of anonymised transcripts was 
undertaken. 
It should be noted that tables 1 and 2 hide considerable diversity. For example, in study 
1, of the early stage firms, three had completed a period of R&D and were about to embark on 
an expansion stage if sufficient funding and resources could be secured. Although a number 
of firms could be described as mature, in a small number of cases this comprised a period of 
non-technological development as they were still engaged in R&D for new products
8
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[Take in Table 1: Study 1: Technology-Based Small Firms Profile Data, 2011] 
 
[Take in Table 2: Study 2: Agri-business Technology-Based Small Firms Profile 
Data, 2013] 
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 This illustrates the difficulty of applying terms such as ‘early stage and ‘mature’ to TBSFs as their stages of 
development can differ and are not necessarily correlated with the age of the business. 
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Findings and Analysis 
The discussion of findings is organised against the main themes that have arisen from 
the analysis of the interview data. These include: the pattern of funding and attitudes to 
external funding, the role of government grants, the importance of both global and local 
networks for accessing finance and other perspectives on the New Zealand environment for 
funding. 
The characteristics  of finance of TBSFs and attitudes to external funding 
In study 1, there was a heavy reliance on internal funding and bootstrapping methods, as 
illustrated by table 1, although a number of TBSFs had managed to raise additional private 
capital through their own contacts and networks. All firms in this sample had relied upon 
internal funding to some extent, however, 13 (65 percent) of the TBSFs either relied totally on 
internal funding (from the initial start-up) or relied upon a combination of internal funding, 
and bootstrapping
9
.  This can be compared with study 2 where a total of 17 (50%) firms relied 
mainly on internal funding; whilst still high, it is indicative of a more proactive seeking of 
external funding by 2013. 
Evidence from study 1 indicated that the entrepreneurs would prefer to fund internally, 
using bootstrapping techniques where possible, even if it meant a slower and perhaps more 
even paced development: 
We have bootstrapped from the start; you have really got to know what you are doing 
with your cashflows and that is challenging” ----“Money earned was put back in the 
business to grow step by step. 1#13 
However, it would be incorrect to indicate that there was total aversion to raising 
external funding, but only a small number had raised venture capital (two companies) or had 
undertaken a search procedure for business angels. Even allowing for the expected reluctance 
of owners to dilute equity, there was a strongly held perception that the informal and formal 
venture capital (VC) markets in New Zealand were very limited and lacked sufficient 
numbers of high net worth individuals with experience of investing in technology-based 
companies. For example, one respondent who had sought VC funds in Australia and NZ 
commented that: 
We focus on highly worth individuals in Australia and New Zealand: that is the target 
market at the moment, because they are more likely to support a business in this part of 
the world. (However) the depth of capital markets is limited in New Zealand. The 
amount of risk capital is very low—and-- the pool for funding technology firms in New 
Zealand is incredibly low. 1#06 
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 Six firms were totally reliant on internal funding; four firms mentioned bootstrapping techniques, 11 firms 
relied upon a combination of internal funds and private investors, six firms used internal funds and government 
grants and only three firms were using either bank loans or overdrafts. 
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A further illustrative comment was made by one respondent that had raised some VC 
funds, but also pointed to the difficulty of raising funding offshore for amounts less than 
NZD5 million: 
It is hard work to get funding in New Zealand, because there are not many places to 
go. It is difficult to get funding outside New Zealand because we are typically too 
small. For a lot of VC organizations (who are looking to invest $5million or more) the 
company is too small.  Other opportunities are offshore but that is also harder, 
because we are not US-based. So we are restricted to where we can go. 1#16 
It is arguable that for TBSFs located in business incubators, the access to investors, 
especially business angels, is increased due to the network established via the incubator. 
Business incubators had sought to establish funds with money from their network of private 
investors through which applications could be made by early stage and start-up companies. 
Location in an incubator raises credibility and is likely to improve access to VC and equity. 
However, there was still a time consuming process to raise external individual business angel 
investment due to the matching process and the stages required before final investment might 
be secured. 
The good news about using angels linked to the incubator is that it’s a real opportunity, 
so they do invest, but it’s a long hard process to get their attention. 1#16 
In study 2, as mentioned above and indicated by table 2, there was more evidence of a 
willingness to raise and seek out external equity funding and venture capital. In two cases this 
was in evidence right from start-up. For example, with case 2#05, the respondent commented 
that the company was a corporate spin-out to exploit more adequately an opportunity (in dairy 
farming), but also was able to seek further venture capital. 
“When the business first started it was a spin-out from another company, with 
ownership just the same------in our second round funding we have got some other VC 
investors.” 2#05 
With case 2#19, the respondent founding entrepreneur and owner commented on how they 
sought a business angel investor from the start. 
My co-founder---(name) ---we had a little bit of seed funding, (but) right away we 
started looking for an angel investor group –looking for $200k—it ended up taking us 
two years ---a lot longer than we had planned. 2#19 
In study 1, the difficulty in raising VC funding locally in New Zealand meant that those 
that were actively seeking such funding were looking overseas, especially to the US. 
The first round capital raising (NZD500K) was needed for marketing and sales side of 
the business. The company got the funding but it was a long, slow and distracting process. 
Second round (18 months later) the company was cashflow positive and achieved the prior 
goal and raised NZD1.1 million for employing sales people.  We were too small for the VCs, 
and the second time just too big to rely on angel investment. 
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And----- 
For raising further funds, the VC market in the US will be approached instead of 
looking for funds in New Zealand, because it is for a larger amount of money. Angels will not 
be interested, but VC’s might become so as we hit the low end of the VC market. 1#16 
The difficulties and immaturity of the New Zealand funding environment was still in 
evidence in study 2, especially for a company such as case 2#34, being a bio-tech company 
with long R&D periods for their projects. With this case, the entrepreneurs sought funding 
from an individual investor based overseas, which they were able to do through one of the 
founding entrepreneurs’ own contacts. 
We found a private investor who (name of entrepreneur) we knew from another life, and 
he is a very wealthy Canadian and he came in and pretty generously supported what we do. 
2#34 
In study 1, there was a distinct reluctance to raise external debt finance. Only a small 
number of TBSFs had sought and raised finance from the commercial banks. There was a 
view that banks are not willing to value intellectual property (IP). One respondent from a 
mature company
10
 commented: “[Obtaining] debt financing is nearly impossible and we can’t 
even get a bank overdraft facility” (1#03). Where bank finance had been secured, not 
surprisingly, it was property that had been used for collateral. 
“The business was funded by a bank loan, as much money as possible with the house as 
collateral. Nearly spent all that money (on product development), but made it back after 
the product launch”. 1#15 
The importance of the role of the commercial banks had changed little with study 2 and there 
was evidence of a “discouraged borrower” effect with respondents. For example, from study 
2, case #31, a recent start-up (although previously a winery business with a financial track 
record) indicated that they were discouraged from applying for bank funding for expansion, 
because of the security requirements. 
“The banks don’t budge, they won’t give you anything even if you’ve got proven 
growth and you’re doing well, they won’t give you any money unless it is 100% 
secured.” 2#31 
With case 2#16, this time a well-established mature company, the owner was still very 
reluctant to use bank finance, preferring to grow more slowly, although the opportunity to 
borrow (from a bank) was available. 
“I never borrowed to grow and it meant that I grew a bit slower than some companies, 
but it meant that if anything went wrong, I wasn’t going to lose my house” 2#16 
One of the implications of such a reliance on internal funding across the two studies meant 
that NPD periods were more lengthy than perhaps they might otherwise have been, or that 
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 Established in 1996 and the largest company by FTEs in our sample from study 1 
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companies were reliant on funding from existing revenues and sales. An illustration is 
provided by case 2#07, a long established manufacturer. The respondent commented on their 
dependence on domestic sales to fund the development of opportunities overseas. 
We’ve relied on the domestic market as our way of making money, we make money in 
the domestic market, then you use that money to fund offshore opportunities, through 
organic growth or otherwise and the domestic market is not a big market. 2#07 
However, despite the existence of discouraged borrowing, there was still recognition of the 
importance of having a good relationship with the bank. For example, in study 2 with case 
2#29, the founding entrepreneur, a fruit producer, reported how the greater recognition 
provided by winning local business awards had helped to attract the attention of commercial 
bankers to his company. 
Every company would need some more funding if they’re going to grow at the pace 
that we’re growing, when your company gets on the radar then you get the attention of 
financers. Funnily enough this week, I’ve got a meeting today with ANZ, and 
tomorrow a meeting with Westpac, so they’re all coming to me saying how can we 
help you, through these awards. 2#29 
Business Angel Networks 
Study 1 (table 1) indicated that companies were actively seeking business angel 
financing and individual investor equity financing overseas, this was partly because of the 
lack of business angel networks (BANs) in New Zealand at the time in 2011, although the 
business incubators such as Creative HQ in Wellington were active in establishing BANs. 
Since that study took place, there has been some more active raising of the profile of BANs 
with some regional networks established. By the time of study 2, a small number of our 
company respondents reported that they had successfully sought and raised either individual 
investor equity financing or business angel funding from a syndicate of business angels. A 
couple of cases from study 2 are illustrative. There is some evidence that fledging local and 
regional business angel networks have now become more mature and are actively investing in 
New Zealand TBSFs particularly in the agri-business sector, characterised by having affluent 
farmers or former farmers and producers active as business angels in the networks. 
Case 2#19, an early stage company involved in bio-technology applications, the 
entrepreneur indicated that he had looked for a business angel syndicate from start-up 
(reported above) as he realised the need to attract such funding for the development of the 
company, which was eventually secured.  
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We finally secured a local group of investors along with the New Zealand SCIF
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Scheme.  We’ve had them on board for 2½ years, there are five individual investors 
that formed an investment vehicle.  2#19 
He further commented on the advantage of having a local business angel network, 
located and based in the Hamilton area. 
The (name of syndicate) network, they were one of the first groups I pitched too and 
they eventually became the ones that invested, but it took a year and a half between 
the first pitch and them finally saying yes, in between there I pitched as far afield as 
the US.  Why did it take so long?, well in the early days we really didn’t have a lot 
more than an idea, a good idea, but not a lot of proof behind it and so I think the New 
Zealand investors were fairly risk averse compared to the others, but because we knew 
them, and they were local, they kept a watching brief over the progress we kept 
making and we kept meeting with them and they kept being interested, we just couldn’t 
quite get them over the line -- fortunately we were in a position of being able to 
continue to fund it, taking the risk ourselves.   In the end they came back and it’s been 
great because they are local. 2#19 
The entrepreneur from case 2#33 was also able to raise equity from a regional business 
angel network, this time based in the Tauranga area. 
It was my company and I did an angel investors pitch and got the new shareholders in, 
because I’d taken (name of company) as far as I could go myself------it was long 
winded, it was a hell of a lot more involved than what I thought it would be, but I think 
the benefits far outweigh the negatives –they are ----all enterprise angels which are 
Tauranga based, all of them -----are associated with the kiwi fruit industry. 2#33 
Perceptions on the role of government grants 
In both studies, not surprisingly, there was a uniform and consistent welcome from the 
technology-based entrepreneurs for support from government grants in the form of 
technology vouchers and direct grant funding. Grants and technology vouchers
12
 were 
effectively free money which could be obtained in a series of stages or rounds. In one case, 
from study 1, the entrepreneurs commented that this source of funding was “critical for their 
business” (1#09). Further there was comment that the grants had made a difference to the 
TBSFs’ capability and speed of development. For example, one respondent commented that: 
“It is a huge help, it could be financed internally but the opportunity wouldn’t be 
exploited because the project is money intensive. It was immensely useful” 1#16 
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 The SCIF Scheme is a Fund operated by New Zealand Venture Investment, an early stage Co-Investment 
Scheme, which encourages early stage business angel financing through matching co-investment partners (see 
http://www.nzvif.co.nz/seed-co-investment-overview.html 
 
12
 Technology vouchers require the business owner to commit ‘matched funding’ to R&D to qualify, whereas 
the former technology development grants were granted mainly on a technical assessment of the project and 
required no matching commitment by the business owner. 
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As mentioned in the introduction, increasing BERD has been an objective of 
Government policy coupled with investments in a new institution, Callaghan Innovation. By 
2013, with study 2, similar comments on increased capability were made by respondents. The 
following views are selected as representative of some experiences with the current (and 
previous) grant-based and voucher system. 
It (funding) definitely is useful and ---- we see there is support and there’s money out 
there to support things you do. You might as well invest a bit of time to access that. 
You can choose the bits that are actually useful for you so you don’t end up 
interacting in ways that are just soaking up your time and you are not getting anything 
back because you can knock it on the head if it’s not working for you. --- and I 
suppose we haven’t had any negative experiences either. 2#05 
We would have done the trial anyway, but not to the scale that Callaghan’s funding 
allowed. And we feel that having the trial R&D exercise go through Callaghan’s 
approval process gave the R&D some legitimacy for DairyNZ and Ag Research to get 
involved. 2#26 
Several respondents mentioned a series of staged applications for grants which ranged 
from $10k to over $100k. However, such grants were for product development rather than 
later stage commercialisation. Our key informants indicated that there was a growing gap 
between government funding for early stage R&D and VC or business angel funding for later 
stage commercialisation. However, some applications were for very substantial funding and 
one respondent said that they had received $7m from government sources with ‘no strings 
attached’13. 
Despite many companies benefiting from technology grants and vouchers, there was 
still a strong preference for tax relief for R&D, where expenditure on R&D can be offset 
against tax liabilities. To illustrate, we give a selection of views from three entrepreneurs and 
their experiences (2#01, 2#21 and 2#34) which support a tax credit system (rather than a 
solely grant-based system). 
I think the National Government got it completely wrong by removing that (tax break). I 
understand (the Minister’s) reasoning that it would be very hard to police and there’s a 
heap of Government tax money not being collected as a result of companies telling lies, 
but on the other hand ------ it’s just enough incentive to keep you going you know. New 
Zealand (has very many) businesses like this (one), that are in their own niche, have got 
their own unique ideas about doing something better and we talk about it all the time. 
Now that tax break made a huge difference, it was fantastic. 2#01 
Well I mentioned our R&D expenditure, so R&D tax relief would be a very good thing 
and I understand there is some sort of discussion paper around at the moment I saw 
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 In comparison to UK equivalents, such as SMART, the application process in New Zealand was much less 
rigorous. Once eligibility criteria had been met, technology grants and vouchers were awarded. This raises the 
issue of the risk of grant dependency in New Zealand, which may have an unintended effect of displacing 
private investors in an already narrow and immature early stage VC market. 
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something about it.  Because our clients are forest growers anything that is an 
impediment to their business is an impediment to our business so clearly getting the (tax 
relief) working again is important to us. 2#21 
We could be bitter, but we came to a decision we’ll take it, if it’s available, you know 
the Canadian model of getting investment tax credits,--- it’s a better way to do it. New 
Zealand has none of that. ---- Like most entrepreneurs we’ve got to do it ourselves, if 
there’s some low hanging Government money, we’ll take it, but you know if we’re 
standing around waiting for the Government to be a critical success factor in our 
success, it’s never going to happen, it’s better that they stay the hell out of the way. 
2#34. 
Importance and role of networks for access to informal finance and information 
We have established in our literature review that networks can be important for access 
to social capital, but they are also important for access to HNWIs and informal sources of 
finance from business angels and, potentially from venture capital companies. They were also 
a factor identified in our discussion of the importance of context. Therefore, we include an 
indicative section on the importance and role of networks and their relevance for access to 
resources and HNWIs as perceived by our respondents. 
With incubator tenants, a common factor mentioned by respondents was the importance 
of advice on business development and market validation of technology, rather than any 
technical assistance. For example one respondent in this group commented: 
The incubator plays an important role in regard to advice and business development. 
The technical side of the idea is covered, but which steps to take for developing a 
business is lacking, so the incubator is helpful for that. 1#17 
Incubators provide important business advice and mentoring support as well as 
providing a level of credibility when start-ups approach investors, but this needs to be tailored 
to the changing needs of TBSFs as they develop. Changing advice needs was illustrated by 
one respondent as follows: 
The first mentor assigned was great for market validation, but rather different skills 
were needed for working in a web-based business. We changed to a new mentor and the 
new one sets direction and focus --(a sounding board and), as a voice of reason. 1#14 
External contacts and networks were obviously important for accessing markets, especially 
for those in overseas markets. As one respondent commented: 
Networking is huge for us—if being overseas for business, at least three telephone 
calls are made for networking purposes (that is, separate from the purpose of the visit 
to develop additional contacts) with--- the best overseas contacts are ex-pat Kiwis. 
1#03 
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Key relationships are part of a company’s strategic networks which can be critical for the 
innovation process. Membership of strategic networks was important for all our TBSF 
companies in both studies, for sharing information, knowledge and for forming more strategic 
partnerships. This can be illustrated with the comments of the founding entrepreneur from 
case 2#05, a company that is a provider of dedicated software for the farming and related 
sectors. In this case, a woman founder who was a member of a recently formed group of 
women technology-based company founders, considered that membership was beginning to 
yield a number of benefits. 
You know I belong to group of women founders of tech businesses and so within that 
group we ----you know somebody knows a developer who’s available, or they have 
done some contract work for them, and they will tend to be smaller business so there 
is that sort of sharing of resources and knowledge and there’s probably all sorts of 
little pockets like that----, it’s been going for about six months and it’s been certainly 
clear as with the more times we meet and talk about things, is the experiences and the 
challenges are different for women and when you get together as a group, a group of 
women actually exchange information in quite a different way than a mixed group. 
2#05 
Although we mentioned in the literature review that there is evidence that TBSFs’ 
strategic networks will be global in nature, our findings suggest that local networks were very 
important for some of our companies. For example, the entrepreneur from case 2#15, a 
provider of technology-based services to the farming sector, commented on how his local 
knowledge and networks had enabled the development of the company. 
I guess I have been involved in the industry for 10 or 12 years, it’s just utilisation of 
those networks I guess --- so some people probably see the business and think that it’s 
had huge growth and it’s accelerated growth, but it’s a result of 10 or 12 years of 
networking within the industry and then sort of pulling all that together in a short time 
which is what we have been able to do. 2#15 
Similarly with cases 2#28 and 2#31, companies involved in horticulture and beverage 
respectively, the entrepreneurs commented on the importance of local networks. 
The local networks have been very useful from that point of view. But I haven’t 
participated in them, but (name of Director) still swears by them. 2#28 
Because they don’t see us a competitor, so we’ve collaborated on making (product) 
with other breweries, and we’ve bounced ideas off them and they’ve given us export 
contacts, and given us leads on tap outlets to get our product into different bars and 
outlets which has been great as well. Definitely networks are really important. 2#31 
The role of early adopters in local markets and local networks was important, not just as a 
testing ground, but also for demonstration purposes. The comments from the founding 
entrepreneur with case 2#05 indicated that their customers, New Zealand dairy farmers, were 
early adopters who can provide information to other potential customers. 
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Because the majority of our customers we know are early adopters and are recognised 
as such in their communities, our strategy is to actually use them as the centre of the 
sale ----- because farmers sell to farmers, so they like to be able to go and talk to 
someone who has got it. 2#05 
Global networks, for some TBSFs, will be more important than local networks. For 
example, case #34, as mentioned previously, had no sales in New Zealand and maintaining 
contacts with clients overseas was important and, as the comment illustrates, actually going to 
see them as well. 
There’s no substitute for going to see your customers and your prospects face to face, 
so we’re at the closest 12 hours, and for our European customers we’re 24 hours 
away just to get to them, so when we were building our collagen business we kind of 
neglected our raw tissue business, and we didn’t go and see them for 2 years, and we 
wondered why business was shrinking, we just weren’t keeping the home fires 
burning. 2#34 
However, at the risk of generalisation and contrary to some of the existing literature, the 
majority of companies in both studies stressed the importance of strategic local networks. 
These were particularly important for those companies in the dairy agri-business sector. 
Perspectives on the New Zealand environment for funding 
In both studies there were frustrations expressed at the nature of the New Zealand 
funding environment, particularly the fragmented nature of funding sources and the small 
pool of equity in capital markets. Thus, some companies inevitably looked to locate and 
develop off-shore. A lack of critical mass was seen to compound the narrowness and 
fragmented nature of sources. Although there is evidence of the development of some clusters 
of activity, such as the digital sector in Wellington, the limited nature of such technology-
based clusters was seen as restrictive. For example, comments were made about the “lack of 
critical mass” and “lack of experience”.  
There are not many people to talk to, there is a very small group of people investing in 
IT and software and those who do invest are quite conservative. 1#19 
However, by far the biggest challenge was seen as securing external investment in their 
companies, especially over the longer term. It was perceived that there is a lack of investors 
willing to take a long term approach, with overseas investors looking to do things faster in 
line with the accelerator model (typically looking for product demonstration within a few 
months rather a year or more). This favoured ‘lean technologies’, notably IT and digital 
technology TBSFs rather than sectors with more intensive R&D such as bio-tech.  
Investors want a return on their investment, and the way they are forced to do that in 
New Zealand is to see you being acquired, it is unfortunate but that is because investors 
here can’t see long term value in staying with you long term. They do not get the 
share/return, whereas the only way they succeed their return is for you to be bought out 
by someone else. 1#19 
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Although there were some improvements in the funding environment by 2013, study 2 
still indicated that the development of additional sources of equity such as local and regional 
BANs were still embryonic. 
Discussion and Implications 
In this section we discuss our results in the light of our research questions. To do this 
we can take RQ1 and RQ2 together for the purposes of this discussion section. 
RQ1: What are the characteristics of the finance of TBSFs in New Zealand? 
RQ2: Has the finance of TBSFs in New Zealand changed over recent years? 
There is still a strong preference for, and reliance on, internal sources with evidence of 
discouraged technology entrepreneurs in relation to both debt and VC funding. However, 
there are some changes in preferences evidenced by study 2. This could be because of the 
strategic importance of the agri-business sector, but the jury is still out on whether there has 
been a significant change in preferences from the demand-side and the stimulation of the 
external equity environment by the Government and economic development agencies on the 
supply-side. 
At the time of undertaking study 1, there was evidence of a number of problems in the 
New Zealand funding environment for TBSFs: 
1. A narrow base of BAs and VC funding. 
2. A lack of BANs. 
3. A lack of maturity and hence learning and experience. 
4. Fatigue arising from the smallness of the equity markets and investors being drawn to 
other markets such as property, because of the length of time taken to make an 
acceptable return. 
5. Angel investors and founders that were being increasingly ‘screwed down’ by VCs in 
terms of valuations
14
. 
At the time, in 2011, although the role of government grants was seen to be positive, 
both in start-up and speeding up development phases, this was not sufficient to overcome 
some of the deficiencies in the funding environment in New Zealand, indicating the lack of a 
funding escalator process. Indeed this was reflected with a number of respondents seeking 
larger sources of funding overseas, particularly in the US. The role of debt finance could at 
best be seen to be marginal with marked reluctance of entrepreneurs to seek debt finance, 
giving further support to theory on discouraged borrowers as mentioned in our literature 
review. 
By 2013, there was evidence of some important developments in equity markets and 
BA funding, although little had changed in debt markets. In 2011 we concluded that there was 
an external equity gap (Deakins and North, 2012, page 97) “There was evidence of a distinct 
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 That is low valuations on early stage angel investor funded companies due to the limited and fragmented VC 
market. 
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finance gap in the external equity market in New Zealand. For amounts below $1m these 
could be sought from networks of business angels, even though such sources were limited and 
restricted. If the funding sought was in the range $1m -$5m, this was likely to fall between the 
informal and formal venture markets”. 
By 2013 there had been some movement and reduction in this gap and there is evidence 
of the emergence of specialised BANs, stimulated in part by the work of local EDAs. Certain 
agri-business TBSFs with viable business growth plans were able to seek and eventually find 
external equity. However, because this development is still at an early stage and appears to be 
targeted at specialised sub-sectors of TBSFs, albeit important sectors for New Zealand, we 
need to be careful in concluding that this has led to a significant change in the funding 
environment. For example, there is still evidence of an over-reliance on internal funds and 
evidence of a discouragement effect to apply for external funding. 
Our findings give strong support for demand side pecking order theories of 
entrepreneurial finance (Myers, 2001). A difference in terms of New Zealand, however, is that 
this preferential order is reinforced by the context of the preferences of HNWIs. As discussed 
in our section on the importance of context, there is a historical preference of HNWI New 
Zealanders to invest in property rather than other assets, making any search procedure for 
business angels more difficult. The reasons for this strong preference by New Zealanders are 
complex and are probably culturally based, but traditionally New Zealanders have viewed 
property investments as a security for their retirement and a state superannuation scheme, the 
KiwiSaver, was only introduced in 2007 and is still a voluntary scheme allowing employees to 
opt out. Obtaining a supply side flow of equity investments from HNWIs is limited and still at 
an immature stage. There were signs that this was beginning to change, albeit slowly, as the 
EDAs sought to build networks of HNWIs. It seems that initial preferences of individual 
business angels will be in sub-sectors where they are familiar with markets and potential 
opportunities. The New Zealand commercial banks, although financially safe and secure and 
not affected by the GFC, are also a reinforcing element of the context. For the commercial 
banks, the well known investment preferences of New Zealanders for property meant that 
they had come to expect that security should be provided to signal commitment by the 
entrepreneur, yet this also meant that there were discouraged borrower effects from an 
expectation that credit would not be available from commercial banks without the collateral 
of personal property.  
Conclusions 
Contrary to initial expectations, New Zealand’s relatively secure and stable financial 
credit institutions, namely the stability of the main commercial banks, have not provided a 
financial environment that has benefited TBSFs in New Zealand compared to their 
counterparts in other developed countries. The lack of a state sponsored loan guarantee 
scheme has also meant that the commercial banks have not been able to transfer their high 
risk loans to any secure basis and will always require 100% guarantees for risk-based projects 
from TBSFs. Hence, some of the comments of our entrepreneurs, from both studies, are not 
surprising and have contributed to a discouraged borrower effect in the technology-based 
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entrepreneurial communities in the main New Zealand urban areas of Auckland, 
Christchurch, Hamilton and Wellington. 
Private equity and venture capital markets were considered to be narrow, fragmented 
and fledging throughout the post GFC period, even though there have been some promising 
developments that have seen activity grow, albeit from a very low base. From an economic 
development perspective, the emergence of Business Angel Networks (BANs), facilitated by 
the regional EDAs has been encouraging and has reflected the growing activity of business 
angels captured by the Angel Association for New Zealand. The development of BANs has 
harnessed latent individual sources of risk capital through networks based on agri-business 
and its sub-sectors such as individual farmers and fruit growers who are looking to invest in 
the sectors in which they have knowledge and experience. In addition, returning ‘cashed out’ 
entrepreneurs (who may have left New Zealand to grow their business) may also prove to be 
an important source of investment for seed and early stage TBSFs.  However, later stage 
development capital and VC sources remain an issue with evidence that TBSFs are either 
forced to search for significant VC funding overseas or become takeover targets for MNCs. 
Government attempts to stimulate equity and VC markets through SCIF and NZVIF has had 
some effect, but this is primarily in early stage funding. 
Direct government support for TBSFs has been through mechanisms such as technology 
grants and vouchers targeted at R&D and later stage growth and project development. Whilst 
such grants have been welcomed as being valuable by our entrepreneur respondents, they 
have not been without criticism. Some technology entrepreneurs expressed a preference for 
R&D tax credits rather than direct grants whilst others perceived grant mechanisms as too 
bureaucratic, discouraging some firms that would have had eligible projects from applying. 
Grants often carry high levels of deadweight (the investment in R&D would have occurred 
without financial support, perhaps at a later time or at a lower level), arguably resulting in 
some firms becoming too grant dependent, so the value of relatively high levels of state 
expenditure could be questioned. However, this would require a full economic evaluation to 
provide an informed opinion. 
Rather perversely, the relatively stable financial environment in New Zealand has not 
benefited TBSFs who are looking for innovative sources of risk capital. For example, there 
has been little in the way of financial innovation in the supply of risk capital. New Zealand 
has, until very recently, nothing to compare with crowd funding platforms that have emerged 
in the US and the UK. TBSFs in New Zealand, far from gaining advantages in being located 
in New Zealand, an economy relatively sheltered from the post GFC economic climate, can 
be considered to have been resource constrained in access to financial capital.  
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Table 1: Study 1: Technology-Based Small Firms Profile Data, 2011 
TBSF Sector Location FTEs Respondent Primary 
Funding 
1#01 Bio-pharm Wn 10 FE Internal 
1#02 Software dvpt Wn 5 FE Internal 
1#03 IT systems PN 42 FE PE 
1#04 Electronics prdt PN 4 FE Internal 
(btstp) 
1#05 Software dvpt Wn 4 FE PE 
1#06 Bio-pharm Wn 3 FE PE 
1#07 Software & IT systems PN 12 FE Internal 
1#08 Software dvpt Wn 8 FE Internal 
(btstp) 
1#09 GPS application & prdt PN 5 FE(s) Internal 
1#10 Media & film prdn Wn 17 L&AD PE 
1#11 Construction prdt Wn 3 MD Internal 
1#12 Software dvpt Wn 21 MD Internal 
(btstp) 
1#13 Software dvpt Wn 19 FE Internal 
(btstp) 
1#14 Admin & support prdt Akl 1 FE Internal 
1#15 Photographic & optical Akl 2 FE Internal = 
bank 
1#16 Software simulation Akl 31 MD BA + VC 
overseas 
1#17 Computer networking Akl 2 FE(s) Internal 
1#18 Interactive software Akl 3 FE BAN 
overseas 
1#19 IT systems Akl 2 FE BAN 
1#20 Interactive software Wn 5 FE Internal 
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Table 2: Study 2: Agri-business Technology-Based Small Firms Profile Data, 2013 
TBSF Agri-business sub-
sector
15
 
Location FTEs Respondent Primary 
Funding 
2#01 Agricultural eqpt (mftr) Ctb 16 FE Internal 
2#02 Agricultural eqpt (mftr) PN 30 FE PE 
2#03 Fertiliser solutions PN area 25 FE PE 
2#04 Agricultural eqpt (mftr) PN area 1 FE Internal 
2#05 Software & farm mgt Wn 3 FE CV 
2#06 Software & fin mgt Wn area 30 FM Internal 
2#07 Large earthmoving eqpt 
(mftr) 
Wn area 65 NPD PE 
2#08 Dairy farming eqpt (mftr) Wn area 12 MD CV 
2#09 Agricultural engineering PN area 43 FE Internal 
2#10 Farm eqpt (mftr) PN area 20 FE Internal 
2#11 Animal feed Ctb 15 NPD PE 
2#12 Dairy farming eqpt Ctb 3 FE Internal 
2#13 Animal feed Ctb 13 NPD CV 
2#14 Flax and oil processing Ctb 8 FE Internal 
2#15 Farm services Ctb 7 FE Internal 
2#16 Remote telemetry Wn area 18 FE Internal 
2#17 Fertiliser & seeds PN area 12 FE Internal 
2#18 Aborculture Hm 3 FE Internal 
2#19 Biotech Hm 4 FE BA 
2#20 Vanilla processing Hm area 3 FE BAN 
2#21 Biotech Hm area 6 FE CV 
2#22 Remote monitoring Akl 8 NPD Internal 
2#23 Mowing equipment 
(mftr) 
Akl area 25 GM VC  
2#24 Aerial photography Akl 18 MD PE 
2#25 Bio-based application Akl area 2 FE Internal 
2#26 Water technology (mftr) Akl 31 MD PE 
2#27 Effluent control Akl 4 FE Internal 
2#28 Hydrophonic systems Akl 9 MD Internal 
2#29 Organic fruit prdcr Akl area 24 FE Internal + 
bank 
2#30 Animal tags (mftr) Akl 80 FE PE 
2#31 Craft cider brewer Akl 4 FE BA 
2#32 Engineering systems 
(mftr) 
Wn area 35 NPD Internal 
2#33 Fruit producer HB 9 FE BAN 
2#34 Biotech HB 11 FE BA 
(overseas) 
 
  
                                                          
15
 Firms were selected and recruited if involved in R&D and technology development applied to the agri-
business sector 
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Key for Tables 1 and 2 
Locati
on 
Akl Auckland PN Palmerston North Wn Wellington 
Ctb Canterbury Ham Hamilton & Waikato HB Hawke’s Bay 
Respo
ndent 
FE Founding entrepreneur(s) MD  Managing Director L&AD Legal & Admin 
NP
D 
New product 
development manager 
FD/
M 
Finance 
Director/Manager 
  
Finan
ce 
BA  Business Angel  PE Private Equity BAN Business Angel 
Network 
CV Corporate venture btstp Bootstrapping 
specifically 
mentioned 
  
 
 
